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Occupation of Public Space
Anglophone Nationalism in
Cameroon
Nantang Jua and Piet Konings
1 In February 2002, we were sitting in a bar in Buea, the capital of the South West Province
of Anglophone Cameroon, watching the Cameroon-Mali football semi-final in the African
Cup of Nations that was being relayed in Cameroon by a French television channel. The
winner of the match was to play Senegal, which had already qualified for the final by
defeating Nigeria.  What  struck us  most  during the match was the sudden change in
attitude  of  our  fellow viewers.  Initially,  they  appeared  to  identify  strongly  with  the
national  team,  as  was  manifest  in  their  comments  on  the  prowess  of  Cameroon’s
“Indomitable  Lions”.  However,  as  soon  as  the  French  commentator  noticed  that,
whatever  the  outcome  of  the  match,  “la  finale  sera  une  affaire  francophone”, almost
reflexively  and  in  unison,  they  shouted:  “Cameroon is  not  a  Francophone  country!”
Suddenly any identification with the national team seemed to have disappeared. Even a
later  remark  by  the  commentator  that  one  of  the  Cameroonian  players  was  an
Anglophone failed to change the mood and restore their enjoyment of the match.
2 The  reaction  of  the  Anglophone  spectators  reminded  us  of  Hobsbawm’s  observation
(1990: 143) that the “imagined communities of millions seem more real than a team of
eleven named people” and demonstrates the importance of identity politics in Cameroon.
It  also  makes  for  an interesting comparison with the disengagement  of  the extreme
nationalist  leader  Jean-Marie  Le Pen  from  the  French  national  team  due  to  its
multicultural  character:  “Je  ne  me  reconnais  pas  dans  cette  équipe.” However,  it  clearly
problematises Fardon’s “football argument”. With specific reference to the widespread
identification  in  Africa  with  national  football  teams,  he  posits  the  development  of
national feelings “in all states that have been independent for more than thirty years…
 The annexation of a neighbouring state, no matter how modest, would soon show the
reality of “national” identities’  (Fardon 1996: 94).  To a large extent, the Cameroonian
situation reflects Cahen’s thesis (1999) that African identification with national teams is
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simply an expression of the habit of living together in the same republic or, even better,
of “constitutional patriotism” (Habermas) rather than of a strongly crystallised national
consciousness. The imagination of a nation (B. Anderson 1983) usually requires a much
longer historical process than Fardon is willing to accept–a process that state policies can
only reinforce but never entirely determine. Cahen cautions that it would be an “erreur
senghorienne” to  assume  that  the  state  would  precede  the  nation,  in  the  sense  of
“producing” or at least “preparing” the nation. In his view, the state can only serve as a
midwife  for  nationisme, the  agenda of  an ultra-minor  elite  to  rapidly  “fabricate”  the
nation. This is a project that is different from nationalism and opposed to existing ethnic
and national identities (Cahen 1999: 153-155). That the Cameroonian post-colonial state’s
nation-building project has failed is clearly evidenced by the fact that nationalist feelings
are  still  rife  in  Anglophone  territory  more  than forty  years  after  reunification  with
Francophone Cameroon.
3 This study argues that the entry of Anglophone nationalism into public space during
political liberalisation in the 1990s has posed a severe threat to the post-colonial nation-
building  project.  Several  Anglophone associations  and pressure  groups  emerged that
have protested against Anglophone marginalisation, assimilation and exploitation by the
Francophone-dominated state in the post-colonial state. They proved capable of placing
the “Anglophone problem” on the national and international agenda, laying claims to
self-determination and autonomy in the form first of a return to the federal state and
later the creation of an independent state.
4 Strikingly,  both Francophone scholars  and politicians  have been inclined to perceive
Anglophone nationalism as an unexpected, recent invention (Donfack 1998; Menthong
1998). They appear to have been convinced that the post-colonial state’s imposition of a
project  of  nationisme upon the  existing ethnic  and national  identities  had effectively
wiped out most traces of “Anglophoneness”, or what Edwin Ardener (1967: 292) referred
to as a “distinctively British Cameroonian way of life”, from the public space. This is
evidenced  by  a  recent  statement  from the  former  vice-prime  minister  in  charge  of
Housing and Town Planning, Hamadou Mustapha: “À un moment donné effectivement, on a
commencé à oublier que les Anglophones étaient là;  on a eu l’impression que les Anglophones
s’étaient déjà francophonisés”1.
5 Francophone scholars and politicians also tend to attribute the emergence of Anglophone
nationalism in the public space mainly to the mobilisation efforts of a few discontented
elites  who  were  denied  a  place  at  the  “dining  table”  during  political  liberalisation
(Sindjoun 1995; Nkoum-Me-Ntseny 1996; Menthong 1998). Their explanation in terms of
opportunist entrepreneurs in search of a political market comes close to the government
position  on  Anglophone  nationalism.  Probably  on  the  assumption  that  government
strategies of control, notably the frequent use of state violence, divide-and-rule tactics,
and the co-optation of some Anglophone elites into the regime, would be effective, they
claim that  Anglophone nationalism will  never  witness  an exponential  growth in  the
public arena (Sindjoun 1995: 114).
6 In  sharp  contrast  to  such  views,  the  first  part  of  this  study  attempts  to  show that
Anglophone nationalism is neither a recent invention nor a mere elitist  project.  It  is
instead the result of a long historical process of identity formation, going back as far as
the beginning of colonialism when two territorial communities were created each with its
own distinct  cultural  legacy.  As  Susungi  (1991)  aptly  observed,  one of  its  immediate
consequences has been that the reunification episode was far from being the reunion of
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two prodigal sons who had been unjustly separated at birth, but was more like a loveless
marriage arranged by the United Nations between two people who hardly knew each
other. The most decisive factor in the construction of an Anglophone identity, however,
has  turned  out  to  be  the  post-colonial  nation-state  project  that  led  Anglophones  to
imagine Cameroon as a prison rather than as a nation.
7 The second part of the article describes how, in the face of persistent attempts by the
Francophone-dominated state to contain the Anglophone danger and control Anglophone
organisation, Anglophones resorted to less visible and controllable forms of protest in the
1990s, creating space for Anglophone identity and nationhood in national history, the
arts, the international courts, in everyday life and even on the Internet. In this section,
particular attention is devoted to what Billig (1995) has called “banal nationalism” – the
representations and symbols  of  nationhood that  are taken for  granted such as  flags,
names, dates and language. The latter are often overlooked in the orthodox conceptions
of nationalism that tend to concentrate on more spectacular forms such as separatist and
extreme nationalist movements (Azaryahu & Kook 2002).
The Emergence of Anglophone Nationalism in Public Space
8 Several authors have tried to explain the emergence and development of what has come
to be called the “Anglophone problem” (Konings & Nyamnjoh 1997, 2000, 2003; Eyoh 1998;
Jua 2003). Most agree that its roots may be traced back as far as the partitioning, after
World War One, of the erstwhile German Kamerun Protectorate (1884-1916) between the
French and English victors, first as mandates under the League of Nations and later as
trusts under the United Nations. As a result of this partitioning, the British acquired two
narrow  and  non-contiguous  regions  in  the  western  part  of  the  country,  bordering
Nigeria.  The  southern  part  and  the  focus  of  our  study  was  christened  Southern
Cameroons, and the northern part became known as Northern Cameroons2. Significantly,
the British territory was much smaller than the French one, comprising only about one
fifth of the total area and population of the former German colony (Mbuagbaw et al. 1987:
78-79). The  partitioning  of  the  territory  into  English  and  French  spheres  had  some
significant  consequences  for  future  political  developments.  Importantly,  it  laid  the
historical and spatial foundation for the construction of Anglophone and Francophone
identities in the territory. The populations in each sphere came to see themselves as
distinct communities, defined by differences in language and inherited colonial traditions
of education, law, public administration and worldview. Second, while French Cameroon
was  incorporated  into  the  French  colonial  empire  as  a  distinct  administrative  unit,
separate  from  neighbouring  French  Equatorial  Africa,  the  British  Cameroons  was
administered as  part  of  Nigeria,  leading to  the blatant  neglect  of  its  socio-economic
development and the increasing migration of Nigerians, notably the Igbo, to the Southern
Cameroons where they came to dominate the regional economy.
9 With the approaching independence of Nigeria in 1960, the population of the British trust
territory was to decide on its political future. It soon became evident that the majority of
the Southern Cameroonians would opt for the creation of an independent state (Awasom
2000; Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003). That their expressed wish was eventually not honoured
must be attributed to two main factors. First, internal divisions among the Anglophone
political elite prevented them from rallying behind the majority option in the territory.
Second, and even more importantly, the United Nations refused, with the complicity of
the British, to put the option of an independent Southern Cameroons state to the voters
in the UN-organised plebiscite of 11 February 1961, on the grounds that the creation of
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another  tiny  state  was  politically  undesirable  (and likely  to  contribute  to  a  further
“Balkanisation” of Africa) and economically unviable (Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003). Being
deprived of this preferred option, Southern Cameroonians were given what amounted to
Hobson’s  choice,  that  is  a  “choice” they had to accept  whether they liked it  or  not:
independence by joining Nigeria or reunification with Francophone Cameroon, which had
become independent in 1960 under the new name of the Republic of Cameroon. In the
end, they chose the lesser of the two evils. Their vote in favour of reunification appeared
to be more a rejection of continuous ties with Nigeria, which had proved to be harmful to
Southern Cameroonian development, than a vote for union with Francophone Cameroon,
a territory with a different cultural heritage and at the time involved in a violent civil war
(Joseph 1977).
10 By reuniting with the former French Cameroon, the Anglophone political elite had hoped
to enter into a loose federal union as a way of protecting their territory’s minority status
and cultural heritage (Konings & Nyamnjoh 1997, 2003). Instead, it soon became evident
that the Francophone political  elite preferred a highly centralised,  unitary state as a
means of promoting national unity and economic development. While the Francophone
elite received strong support from the French during the constitutional negotiations, the
Anglophone  elite  was  virtually  abandoned  by  the  British,  who  deeply  resented  the
Southern  Cameroons  option  for  reunification  with  Francophone  Cameroon  (Awasom
2000). As a result, a rumour quickly spread through the region that Charles de Gaulle
looked upon the Southern Cameroons as “a small gift of the Queen of England to France”
(Milne  1999:  432-448;  Gaillard  1994).  In  the  end,  during  the  constitutional  talks  at
Foumban  in  July  1961,  the  Francophone  elite  was  only  prepared  to  accept  a  highly
centralised federation, which was regarded merely as a transitional phase to a unitary
state. Such a federation demanded relatively few amendments to the 1960 constitution of
the Republic of Cameroon. Interestingly, Pierre Messmer (1998: 134-135), one of the last
French  high  commissioners  in  Cameroon and  a  close  advisor  of  President  Ahmadou
Ahidjo,  pointed  out  that  he  and  others  knew at  the  time  that  the  so-called  federal
constitution provided merely a “sham federation”, which was “safe for appearance, an
annexation of West Cameroon (the new name of the former Southern Cameroons)”3.
11 Under the new constitution, West Cameroon lost most of the limited autonomy it had
enjoyed as part of the Nigerian federation (Ardener 1967; Stark 1976). Even worse, a few
months after reunification, Ahidjo created a system of regional administration in which
West  Cameroon was designated as  one of  six regions,  basically ignoring the political
character of the country. These regions were headed by powerful federal inspectors who,
in the case of West Cameroon, in effect overshadowed the prime minister with whom
they were in frequent conflict concerning jurisdiction (Stark 1976).  Besides,  the West
Cameroon  government  could  barely  function  since  it  had  to  depend  entirely  on
subventions from the federal government that controlled the major sources of revenue.
When,  in  1972,  Ahidjo  created  a  unitary  state  in  blatant  disregard  of  constitutional
provisions,  there  was  in  reality  little  left  of  the federation,  except  perhaps  in  name
(Benjamin 1972). What many regarded as one of the last visible symbols of the 1961 union
was  removed  in  1984  when  Ahidjo’s  successor,  Paul  Biya,  abolished  the  appellation
“United Republic  of  Cameroon” and replaced it  with “Republic  of  Cameroon”,  which
significantly  was  the  name of  the  Francophone part  of  the  country  when it  became
independent in 1960.
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12 An even more decisive factor for the development of the Anglophone problem, however,
was the nation-state project after reunification. For the Anglophone population, nation-
building has been driven by the firm determination of the Francophone political elite to
dominate the Anglophone minority in the post-colonial state and to erase the cultural
and institutional foundations of Anglophone identity (Eyoh 1998). Several studies have
shown  that  Anglophones  have  regularly  been  relegated  to  inferior  positions  in  the
national  decision-making  process  and  have  been  constantly  underrepresented  in
ministerial  as  well  as  senior-  and  middle-level  positions  in  the  administration,  the
military  and parastatals  (Kofele-Kale  1986;  Takougang & Krieger  1998).  A  few recent
examples seem to substantiate Anglophone allegations of systematic discrimination in
the recruitment for government posts.  In February 2003 it was announced that there
were only 57 Anglophone youths among the more than five thousand new recruits joining
the  police  academies4.  The  next  month  records  show  that  there  were  only
12 Anglophones among the 172 new recruits into the Customs Department. And, even
more significantly, these Anglophones were only given junior staff positions while all the
senior  staff  positions  went  to  Francophones5.  There  is  also  general  agreement  that
Anglophones have been exposed to a carefully considered policy aimed at eroding their
language and institutions even though Francophone political leaders had assured their
Anglophone  counterparts  during  the  constitutional  talks  on  reunification  that  the
inherited colonial differences in language and institutions were to be respected in the
bilingual union. And, last but not least, the relative underdevelopment of the Anglophone
region shows that it has not benefited sufficiently from its rich resources, particularly oil.
Gradually, this created an Anglophone consciousness: the feeling of being recolonised and
marginalised in all spheres of public life and thus of being second-class citizens in their
own country.
13 While there is a general tendency among Anglophones to blame the Francophone elite for
the entire Anglophone problem, it cannot be denied that Anglophone political leaders
bear  an  important  share  of  the  responsibility  for  the  Anglophone  predicament.
Apparently, when they realised that their influence within the federated state of West
Cameroon was beginning to be whittled down, the federal arrangements no longer suited
their designs. They started competing for Ahidjo’s favours and aspiring to positions of
power within the single party and the federal government and eventually within the
unitary state, thus blatantly neglecting the defence of West Cameroon’s autonomy and
interests (Kofele-Kale 1986; Eyoh 1998).
14 The co-optation of the Anglophone elite into the “hegemonic alliance” (Bayart 1979) and
the autocratic nature of the post-colonial regimes prevented Anglophones from openly
organising in defence of their interests until the political liberalisation process in the
early  1990s.  The newly created Anglophone movements  were  then able  to  place  the
Anglophone  problem  on  the  national  and  international  agenda6.  While  the  Buea
Declaration,  issued after the historic First All  Anglophone Conference (AAC  I)  in April
1993, still called for a return to a two-state federation, the Biya government’s persistent
refusal  to enter into any negotiations caused a growing radicalisation of  Anglophone
movements.  In  the  so-called  Bamenda  Proclamation,  adopted  by  the  Second  All
Anglophone Conference (AAC  II) held in Bamenda from 29 April to 1 May 1994, it was
stipulated  that  “should  the  government  either  persist  in  its  refusal  to  engage  in
meaningful constitutional talks or fail to engage in such talks within a reasonable time, the
Anglophone leadership would proclaim the revival of the independence and sovereignty
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of  the  Anglophone  territory  and  take  all  measures  necessary  to  secure,  defend  and
preserve the independence, sovereignty and integrity of the said country” (Konings &
Nyamnjoh 1997: 218-220).
15 Following the AAC II, the Anglophone movements provocatively re-introduced the name of
Southern Cameroons to refer to the Anglophone territory so as to “make it clear that our
struggles are neither of  an essentially linguistic character nor in defence of  an alien
colonial  culture…  but  are  aimed  at  the  restoration  of  the  autonomy  of  the  former
Southern  Cameroons  which  has  been  annexed  by  the  Republic  of  Cameroon”7.   The
umbrella organisation of all the Anglophone movements was subsequently named the
Southern  Cameroons  National  Council  (SCNC).  The  SCNC leadership  soon  adopted  a
secessionist  stand,  striving  for  an  independent  Southern  Cameroons  state  through
peaceful negotiation with the regime, the “sensitisation” of the regional population and a
diplomatic offensive. Widespread euphoria could be felt in Anglophone Cameroon when a
SCNC delegation returned from a mission to the United Nations in 1995. During rallies
attended by huge crowds in several Anglophone towns, the delegation displayed a large
UN flag, claiming it had received it from the UN to show that the Southern Cameroons was
still a UN trust territory and that independence was only a matter of time8.
16 From 1996 onwards,  however,  Anglophone movements appeared to rapidly lose their
initial  momentum.  Two  factors  were  mainly  responsible  for  this  unfortunate
development. First, the Biya government proved capable of neutralising the Anglophone
movements to a large extent by employing a number of long-standing tactics including
divide-and-rule, co-opting Anglophone leaders into the regime, and severe repression.
Second, there was the problem of leadership. With the resignation of the founding fathers
from the leadership, the SCNC lacked competent and committed leadership. Given the
leadership  problem  and  the  government’s  persistent  reluctance  to  enter  into  any
negotiations, a conflict developed within the Anglophone movements between the doves–
those who continued to adhere to a negotiated separation from La République du Cameroun
9–and  the  hawks–those  who  had  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  independence  of
Southern Cameroons  would  only  be  achieved through armed struggle.  The  Southern
Cameroons Youth League (SCYL) in particular opted for the latter strategy (Konings &
Nyamnjoh 2000).
17 However, it would be a grave error to assume that the Anglophone movements became
fully paralysed or even defeated by divisive and repressive government tactics and their
own organisational and strategic shortcomings. Of late, Anglophone struggles appear to
have acquired a new impetus. On 30 December 1999, Justice Frederick Alobwede Ebong, a
SCNC activist with close ties to the SCYL, took over the Cameroon Radio and Television (
CRTV) station in Buea, proclaiming the restoration of the independence of the Ex-British
Southern Cameroons. This was followed by the nomination of a provisional government
and the  announcement  of  a  coat  of  arms,  a  flag  and a  national  anthem (Konings  &
Nyamnjoh 2003).
18 Significantly,  owing  to  these  and  previous  events,  an  increasing  number  of  pro-
government Anglophone and Francophone elite now acknowledge, after long years of
public denial, that there is indeed an Anglophone problem. In January 1999, President
Paul Biya for the first time admitted, albeit in a dismissive fashion, that such a problem
existed, even if he perceived it as one created by a handful of hotheads and vandals. Still,
he has not yet shown any interest in negotiating with Anglophone movements in spite of
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regular appeals by Anglophone, Francophone and international dignitaries to solve the
Anglophone problem through dialogue10.
19 Faced  with  determined  attempts  by  the  Biya  government  to  control  Anglophone
organisations and deconstruct the Anglophone identity,  Anglophone nationalists have
increasingly adopted less visible and less controllable strategies to place the Anglophone
problem in the public space.
Bringing Back Anglophone Identity into Historical Space
20 The  regime  and  organic  scholars  (Ahidjo  1968;  Forje  1981;  Fogui  1990)  have  often
attempted to historicise Cameroon only in terms of its present mobilisation needs, in
particular the construction of a national consciousness as part of the nation-building
project11. They are, therefore, engaged in an impressive dose of historical amnesia–willed
acts of selective remembrance of the past so as to erase Anglophone identity and heritage
from national history. Anglophone nationalist leaders and scholars, in turn, have quickly
recognised the importance of rediscovering Anglophone history as an invaluable political
resource  in  combating  the  regime  and  raising  the  consciousness  of  the  Anglophone
population. They have therefore attempted to bring back Anglophone identity into the
historical space, strongly contesting some of the myths created by the regime and organic
scholars. We have only room here for a few examples.
21 One myth is that “Cameroon has always been one and no more”12.  In creating this myth,
the regime and organic  scholars  attempt to  dismiss  the role  of  the colonial  state  in
“inventing” Cameroon itself and in creating two distinct communities on Cameroonian
territory.  Unlike  Ardener  (1967),  they  are  arguing  that  Cameroon  was  already  in
existence before colonial rule and that colonialism only fostered a rupture in the pre-
colonial conviviality and cordiality traditions that were “determining ancestral values”.
Consequently,  Anglophones  should  “transcend  historical  barriers”  and  return  to  the
original situation in which all people in Cameroon lived together amicably and peacefully
(Nkoum-Me-Ntseny 1996). Anglophone nationalists have instead constantly argued that
the colonial state was far more important than the (largely mythical) pre-colonial state in
mapping out the historical trajectory of the post-colonial state (Konings & Nyamnjoh
2003).
22 A second myth is that reunification signified a long-awaited reunion of people separated
for many years by arbitrarily imposed colonial borders and thus was warm-heartedly and
freely embraced by both parties (Donfack 1998: 35). Anglophone nationalists have instead
provided sufficient evidence that the people in both territories were reluctant to reunite.
Not  only  had  the  two  communities  gone  through  two  completely  different  colonial
experiences prior to reunification but they had also lived longer apart than together in a
body politic. The idea of reunification, which had been mainly propagated by the radical
nationalist party in Francophone Cameroon, the Union des populations du Cameroun (UPC),
and Francophone immigrants in Anglophone Cameroon (Joseph 1977; Awasom 2000), had
for a long time remained a mere slogan in Anglophone Cameroon and had simply been
rejected by the French colonial  administration and the majority  of  the Francophone
political elite. Many Anglophones did eventually vote for reunification but only after they
had been forced by external  forces to abandon their preferred option of  creating an
independent state. The idea of unification was not debated in Francophone governmental
circles until February 1958 when the French High Commissioner, Jean Ramadier, assured
Alcam,  the territory’s  parliament,  of  “independence as  well  as  the union of  the two
Cameroons”–most probably a tactical strategy to appropriate the cherished slogans of the
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UPC rebels and deprive them of their ideological platform. His caution that these issues
fell within the reserved competence of the French government was superfluous because
Anglophone Cameroon was terra incognita to the parliamentarians. Even when Ahmadou
Ahidjo  replaced  André-Marie  Mbida  as  prime  minister  in  the  course  of  that  year,
reunification was still seen as “un ajout du haut commissaire” (Gaillard 1994: 84-89). Even on
the  eve  of  the  UN-organised  plebiscite  in  Anglophone  Cameroon  in  February  1961,
reunification remained low on Ahidjo’s list of political preferences which, according to a
United States intelligence report, were as follows: (i) to lose in both the Southern and
Northern  Cameroons;  (ii)  to  win  in  the  Northern  Cameroons  where  his  ethnic  and
religious  brothers,  the  Fulbe  Muslims,  were  in  power,  and  to  lose  in  the  Southern
Cameroons ruled by an elite with close ethnic ties to his opponents in the southwestern
part of Francophone Cameroon; (iii) to win in both regions; or (iv) to win in the Southern
Cameroons and lose in the Northern Cameroons13. This shows that Ahidjo, whose power
position was still weak in Francophone Cameroon in the time preceding reunification,
was more concerned with reinforcing his electoral base than with reunification per se
(Awasom 2000; Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003). He did not want to upset the current situation
and thereby cause a shift in power relations.
23 A third myth is that the 1961 Foumban Conference was a historic event where estranged
brothers mutually agreed upon a federal constitution for a reunified Cameroon. However,
for Anglophone nationalists,  the conference was an occasion where the Francophone
majority used its superior bargaining strength to control negotiations and enforce a form
of federation far below Anglophone expectations. Lack of respect by Francophones for
even  the  minimal  “consensus”  arrived  at  in  Foumban  has  been  traumatic  for
Anglophones  and has  come to  play  an essential  role  in  their  collective  identity  and
psychopathology.
24 A fourth myth is that the unitary state was the outcome of the massive vote by the
Cameroonian  people  as  voluntarily  expressed  in  the  1972  referendum.  Anglophone
nationalists have instead pointed out that,  given growing Anglophone disillusionment
with the union, the referendum results were more likely a manifestation of the regime’s
autocratic  nature than of  the Anglophone population’s  support.  In other words,  fear
prevented Anglophones from expressing their objective interests. The ballot box was far
from secret, election results were fixed beforehand, and it was neither politically wise nor
politically safe to hold and express views different from those of the president, let alone
oppose in word or deed any of his plans or actions. In 1991, Solomon Tandeng Muna, who
was prime minister of the federated state of West Cameroon and vice-president of the
federal republic at the time of the referendum, admitted in a radio interview that he had
not dared to reveal to Ahidjo the true feelings of Anglophones about the referendum
because it would have been tantamount to signing his own death warrant (Boh & Ofege
1991: 16).
25 Strikingly, Anglophone nationalists have also been deeply concerned with naming and
the  removal  of  historical  documents  by  the  government.  Although  such  issues  may
initially  appear  somewhat  “banal”,  they  turn  out  to  be  closely  connected  with  the
symbolic construction and preservation of Anglophone identity and heritage.
26 Anglophone nationalists refuse to recognise the government’s designation of 20 May, the
date of the inauguration of the unitary state in 1972, as the country’s National Day. Since
the  early  1990s,  they  have  continued to  boycott  celebrations,  declaring  it  a  “Day of
Mourning” and a “Day of Shame”. They also indict the regime for declaring 11 February,
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the  day  of  the  1961  plebiscite,  as  Youth Day.  They  see  the  persistent  failure  of  the
government to highlight the historical significance of this day as a conscious attempt to
reconfigure the nation’s history. They have thus called upon the Anglophone population
to  mark  11 February  as  the  “Day  of  the  Plebiscite”  and  1 October  as  the  “Day  of
Independence” as alternative days of national celebration. On these days, Anglophone
activists  have  frequently  attempted  to  hoist  the  federation,  the  United  Nations  or
independent Southern Cameroons flags–attempts that were often brutally challenged by
the security forces.
27 Anglophones  have  also  continuously  resisted  government  attempts  to  change  the
historical  names  of  localities  in  their  territory.  They  have  particularly  opposed  the
change of name of Victoria, a coastal town named after Queen Victoria (Courade 1976),
into Limbe, the name of a river that flows through the town. This renaming of localities in
Anglophone Cameroon has often been presented as a government attempt to promote
what Mobutu has referred to in Zaire as “authenticité”. Government failure to implement a
similar policy in Francophone Cameroon is clear proof that its avowed goal was to erase
the Anglophone identity and history14. Anglophone nationalists have re-introduced the
name of Victoria during political liberalisation. Even Anglophones who tend to support
the government’s project of nationisme seem to be ambivalent in their attitude towards
renaming. While they usually attempt to erase the name Victoria from the public space,
they sometimes appear to align with the “subversives” by respecting the name of the
local football club, Victoria United, and maintaining the name of their own local college
network, the Victoria Old Boys’ Association (VOBA).
28 Whatever the motivation, the removal of certain documents by the central government
from the archives in Buea was also seen by Anglophones as an attempt to erase the
institutional  memory  of  Anglophone  Cameroon.  Anglophone  perception  was
strengthened by the belief that the archives were a repository for documents that could
give the regional population an insight into what really transpired before, during and
after  the  Foumban  Conference.  It  was  even  rumoured  that  one  of  these  documents
envisaged  secession  should  Anglophones  be  discontent  with  the  outcome  of  the
conference after a stipulated period of time. Remarkably, in the wake of the death in 1999
of John Ngu Foncha, the Anglophone architect of reunification, another rumour rapidly
spread in Anglophone Cameroon that this particular document, almost the holy grail of
Anglophone  nationalism,  which  the  government  wanted  to  remove  from  the  Buea
archives, had actually been in the custody of Foncha after reunification. He was said to
have handed it over to Augustine Ngom Jua, his successor as prime minister in 1965.
Following Jua’s dismissal in 1967, it would have been recovered from his office, sealed,
and returned to Foncha who had hidden it in a relative’s grave in the Mankon Catholic
cemetery in Bamenda. Ambassador (retired) Henry Fossung, a leader of one of the SCNC
factions, claimed that Foncha had given it to him shortly before his death. Arguably, this
is a variant of “grave digging” by a leader in quest of legitimacy. However, it acquires
some respectability when it is placed in the perspective of a deep Anglophone concern
with its past and identity.
Creating Space for Anglophone Identity in Arts
29 Art forms,  as Karin Barber (1987:  4)  has observed,  “do not merely reflect an already
constituted consciousness, giving us a window to something already fully present, they
are  themselves  important  means  through which  consciousness  is  articulated  and
communicated”. Confronted with severe state repression, Anglophone nationalists have
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resorted  to  the  arts  to  create  public  space  for  the  Anglophone  problem  and  raise
Anglophone consciousness and action. In this section, we focus on Anglophone dramatists
and performers who have played a major role in this respect (Lyonga et al. 1993; Ako
2001).
30 Among  the  growing  number  of  Anglophone  playwrights15,  two  in  particular  have
identified with the Anglophone struggles:  Bate Besong and Epie Ngome. Bate Besong,
Anglophone Cameroon’s most versatile and charismatic playwright and poet, has always
maintained  that  the  Anglophone  creative  writer  “must  arouse  his  Anglophone
constituency from the apathy and despair into which it has ‘sunk’ and transform his
writing into ‘hand grenades’ to be used against Francophone oppressors” (Ngwane 1993:
35). A cursory overview of his own writing leaves one in no doubt that Bate Besong has
lived up to his own prescriptions. His Beasts of No Nation (1990) is a bitter indictment of the
Francophone exploitation of the Anglophones who are reduced to “night soilmen” (a
metaphor for slavery). Throughout the play, the Francophones are presented as reckless
destroyers of the nation because of their unbridled appetites and moral insensitivity.
They are “ravenous wolves” or “roaring lions” seeking to devour all that crosses their
path. They are “locusts” who “eat tons of green”. They are “thieves of no nation” who
belong to a secret cult of “greed, grab and graft”. The exploited “Anglos”, however, are
going to demand their full civil rights or, what the dramatist calls, their “identification
papers”. The narrator, a kind of priest who will lead the down-trodden Anglos to the New
Jerusalem, makes it clear that they will have their freedom–perhaps a nation of their
own–or death. And the leitmotiv that runs through the play is: “A hero goes to war to die”
(Ako 2001).
31 For his part, Epie Ngome in What God Has Put Asunder (1992) uses an extended marriage
metaphor to denounce the union between Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon and
the unitary state. It is the story of Weka, a child brought up in an orphanage run by
Reverend Gordon and Sister Sabeth. When Weka reaches marriageable age, two suitors
ask for her hand in marriage. One is Miché Garba and the other Emeka, who grew up in
the orphanage with Weka. Despite Emeka’s solid claims over Weka as a childhood friend,
Garba has his way although Weka accepts him reluctantly.  Weka soon discovers that
Garba is no good: he maltreats and neglects her and cannot tolerate her questioning
attitude. He exploits the rich cocoa farms left by her father and squanders the money on
his concubines. When she can stand him no longer, Weka escapes with her children to her
father’s  compound  to  rebuild  his  dilapidated  house  and  their  shattered  lives.  Garba
pursues her there, threatening to forcefully take them back to his house.
32 Clearly,  the  marriage  metaphor  relates  to  the  political  union  between  Anglophone
Cameroon and its Francophone counterpart,  with Weka standing for the former West
Cameroon, Emeka for Nigeria, and Garba for La République du Cameroun. Weka’s parents
represent  the  British  government  that  relinquished responsibility  over  the  Southern
Cameroons.  Reverend  Gordon  and  the  orphanage  stand  for  the  United  Nations
trusteeship  mandate  over  Southern  Cameroons.  Garba’s  neglectful  but  exploitative
attitude towards Weka represents the attitude of the Francophone leadership towards
Anglophone Cameroon, behaviour that has come to represent the central grievance in
what Anglophones have identified as the Anglophone problem in Cameroon (Ambanasom
1996: 218-222).  The major suffering inflicted by Miché Garba on Weka symbolises the
creation of the unitary state in 1972:
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“Once the festivities were over, he brought a fleet of trucks and bundled all my
children and me out of our house. His drivers gathered all our staff trampling and
damaging many things and so he forced me to settle in with him. Since then, he has
been forcing my children to learn his own mother tongue and to forget mine with
which they grew up; I  must abide by the customs of his clan, not mine, and…in
short he has simply been breathing down my neck since then” (Ngome 1992: 53).
33 Both  playwrights  have  contributed  in  no  small  way  to  the  overall  education  of
Anglophones, which will only be achieved, as Bate Besong highlights in his Requiem for the
Last Kaiser (1991), when Anglophones “will break the chains that hold them in bondage”
and “choose the side of the long suffering people of Agidigi (Anglophone Cameroon)”.
34 Anglophone plays by these and other writers have been made accessible to ordinary
Cameroonians by various theatre groups including the Yaoundé Theater Troupe and the
Flame Players (Doho 1996). They have not only played in Yaoundé and other Francophone
towns,  but have also toured both Anglophone provinces and some groups have even
performed  in  Europe.  Plays  staged  by  the  Mountain  Mourners  in  Germany  have
contributed inordinately to bringing the Anglophone plight to international attention.
Placing Anglophone Identity in Virtual Space
35 Following political liberalisation, the Anglophone private press served for some time as
the  standard  bearer  of  Anglophone  nationalism  (Konings  &  Nyamnjoh  2000).
Unsurprisingly,  the government quickly sought to muzzle it as part of its strategy to
erase Anglophone identity from public space. In reaction, “new creoles” have emerged
among Anglophone nationalists–men who have access to virtual space, enabling them to
contest the state’s power of policing speech (J. Anderson 1995). The Anglophone youth in
the  diaspora,  notably  in  the  United  States,  have  underscored the  importance  of  the
Internet. The SCNC-North America (NA) has actually played a vanguard role in creating
websites on the Internet16. The name of the main site was changed17 in July 2001 as “part
of  its  ongoing strategy to  unite  the forces  of  Southern Cameroons’  liberation in  the
diaspora and on the home front”, providing them as well as visitors with “a one-stop-
source  to  learn  and  update  themselves  about  Southern  Cameroons,  one  of  the  only
African countries still under colonialism and seeking for ways to effect its independence”
18.  It is considered to be the largest Cameroonian site, receiving, at its peak, more than
500 hits a day. It registered more than 700 members in its first month of existence19.
36 Since  its  members  were  regularly  engaged  in  ideological and  strategic  warfare,  the
management of the site decided to introduce gate keeping, seeking to orient discussions
towards the achievement of the independence of Southern Cameroons. To this end, it
became more and more preoccupied with fostering political correctness,  going to the
extent of “unsubscribing” members with alternative views.
37 The site’s new policy is to raise Anglophone consciousness and to promote the visibility of
the Anglophone cause inside and outside Cameroon. One of its most successful activities
has been the posting of declassified documents from the British archives, which provide
ample evidence of the alleged British betrayal of the Southern Cameroons in the pre-
reunification era. It aimed to make the Cameroonian and British people aware of the
refusal of the British government to protect Southern Cameroonian interests against the
Ahidjo regime supported by the French and to solicit  their  support  for  the renewed
struggle for the independence of Southern Cameroons.
38 Interestingly, the raising of consciousness is often combined with action. For example,
the site  reported extensively on what happened during and after  the SCNC-organised
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celebrations of “Independence Day” on 1 October 2001, thus frustrating the government’s
attempts to control  information to the outside world and cover up certain activities.
Despite  government  orders  banning  all  demonstrations  throughout  the  Anglophone
region,  a  considerable number of  SCNC activists  decided to march in the North West
Province of Anglophone Cameroon on that day,  defying the massive police and army
presence.  At  Kumbo,  five  peaceful  demonstrators  were  killed  and  many  more  were
injured. Over 200 SCNC activists were arrested in Bamenda and elsewhere, including the
new SCNC leaders.  Significantly,  when Anglophone magistrates eventually ordered the
release of the detainees, court orders were flouted by the regime. The BSCNation site sent
this information to other websites as a form of e-protest. Pressure for the release of the
detainees was reinforced by its management’s organisation of a protest march on the
Cameroon Embassy in Washington. This combination of virtual and real modes of protest
eventually caused the Cameroonian government to release the activists.
39 Another example of cooperation between the site management and the SCYL in May 2002
was  a  spectacular  action called  “Operation Stamp Your  Identity”.  Eighteen thousand
bumper stickers calling for the creation of a federal republic in Anglophone Cameroon
were  printed  in  the  United  States  and  sent  to  Anglophone  Cameroon.  They  were
symbolically  flagged  in  Anglophone  towns  on  20 May  2002,  the  day  that  Cameroon
celebrated its 30th anniversary of the unitary state.
40 These examples show how cooperation between the new creoles and activists has proved
to be successful in advancing the Anglophone cause and raising the consciousness of the
national and international community.
Expansion of Anglophone Identity into Legal Space
41 Anglophone  nationalism  still  lacks  international  recognition.  This  has  prevented
Anglophone nationalists from presenting their case before international courts. Several
attempts  to  sue  Britain  in  British  courts  for  its  “treacherous”  role  during  the
decolonisation process have been to no avail. However, the decision of the Nigerian and
Cameroonian governments to submit their dispute over the oil-rich peninsula of Bakassi
to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague for adjudication in 1994 offered
Anglophone nationalists an opportunity to access legal space (Weiss 1996). They claimed
that Bakassi was neither a part of Cameroon nor of Nigeria but instead belonged to the
Southern Cameroons.
42 In 2001, the Ex-British Southern Cameroons Provisional Administration created a new
body, the Southern Cameroons People’s Organisation (SCAPO), for the specific purpose of
pursuing legal avenues to address “the claims of the peoples of Southern Cameroons to
self-determination and independence from La République du Cameroun”. SCAPO, led by the
SCNC chairman and chancellor of the provisional administration Dr Martin Luma, and
Dr Kevin Gumne, rapidly filed a lawsuit against the Nigerian government in the Federal
High  Court  in  Abuja  “for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  judicial  relief  to  restrain  the
government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria from treating or continuing to treat or
regard the Southern Cameroons or the people of that territory as an integral part of La
République du Cameroun”20.  SCAPO had two reasons for taking Nigeria to court in its legal
battles for the recognition of an independent Southern Cameroons state. First, the trust
territory of Southern Cameroons had been administered by Britain as an integral part of
Nigeria.  Consequently,  SCAPO was inclined to regard Nigeria  as  a  co-conspirator with
Britain  in  the  process  that  led  to  the  annexation of  the  Southern Cameroons  by  La
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République du Cameroun. Second, Nigeria had ratified the OAU Banjul Charter of Human
Rights that lays down in Article 20 the right of all colonised or oppressed people to free
themselves from the bonds of domination by resorting to any means recognised by the
international community.
43 In the end, SCAPO scored a landmark victory when, in March 2002, the Nigerian Federal
High Court ruled that “the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be compelled to place before
the ICJ and the UN General Assembly and ensure diligent persecution to the conclusion the
claims of the peoples of Southern Cameroons to self-determination and their declaration
of independence”. It also placed a perpetual injunction, restraining “the government of
the Federal Republic of Nigeria from treating the Southern Cameroons and all the peoples
of the territory as an integral part of La République du Cameroun”21.
44 This ruling may pave the way for international recognition of the Anglophone struggle
for the creation of an independent state. Yet, it cannot be overlooked that Nigeria had an
interest in the court’s ruling if one takes into account the ongoing hearings in the Bakassi
case at the ICJ. This was clearly recognised by the Nigerian Federal High Court when it
ordered the Nigerian government to submit to the ICJ the question of whether it is the
Southern Cameroons and not La République du Cameroun that ought to share a maritime
boundary with the Federal Republic of Nigeria?
Experiencing Anglophone Identity in Everyday Space
45 Anglophones are daily reminded of their national identity and homeland in language, in
individual  and  collective  experiences,  and  in  stereotyping.  They  tend  to  perceive
themselves as different from Francophones and are equally categorised and treated as
“others” by Francophones, manifest already in the constant use of “we” and “they” in
everyday speech for designating or delineating each other’s homeland (Billig 1995: 93-95).
Undoubtedly,  feelings  of  being  different  tend  to  raise  the  individual  and  collective
consciousness of Anglophones in everyday space and to create open or secret support for
Anglophone movements.
46 Given the widespread belief in the country that Anglophones have become the greatest
danger  to  the  regime’s  nation-building  project  and even to  the  regime itself  during
political  liberalisation,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  Francophone  political  elites  are
inclined to exclude them from the homeland and incite  the Francophone population
against  them.  The Lord Mayor of  Yaoundé,  Emah Basile,  referred to Anglophones as
“enemies in the house”. As such, they should either voluntarily “go across our borders”
as Mbombo Njoya, the former minister of territorial administration and present Sultan of
Foumban, once remarked or be chased away (Ngniman 1993: 51). Francophones tend to
refer to Anglophones as “Anglo-fools”, Biafrans or Nigerians. By using the term Biafran,
they are expressing their strong belief that Anglophones are inclined to be secessionists.
By  using  the  term  Nigerian,  they  point  to  the  colonial  link  between  the  Southern
Cameroons and Nigeria. We recently heard the story that when told by a visitor that he
hailed from Kumba,  the economic capital  of  the South West Province in Anglophone
Cameroon, the Cameroonian Ambassador to Belgium, Isabelle Bassong, exclaimed: “Oh,
Kumba, donc vous êtes moitié Nigérien et moitié Camerounais.”
47 Even  Anglophones  who  speak  impeccable  French  and  have  lived  in  Francophone
Cameroon for a long time are constantly reminded of the fact that they are different. A
young, well-educated Anglophone woman interviewed by Eyoh (1998: 263) expressed her
frustration with the situation as follows:
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“No matter how bilingual you are, if you enter an office and demand something in
French, because of your accent, the messenger may announce your arrival simply
as ‘une Anglo’ or respond in a manner to mock. You know that stereotypes are a
normal part of life in Cameroon and the world over. But the constant reminder that
as an Anglophone you are different creates the impression that we are second-class
citizens. That is what irritates Anglophone elites. You can imagine the frustration
of older and less educated Anglophones who have to deal with a bureaucracy which
operates mostly in French and state officials who are so rude to the people they are
supposed to serve.”
48 In a column of a well-known Cameroonian paper, Le Messager, a French journalist reports
the experience of a young Anglophone who had just returned to Cameroon after a five-
year  stay in South Africa  and was made to feel  like a  stranger  in his  own so-called
bilingual country. When he came to pay in a large bakery in Douala, he received a cool
reception from one of  the Francophone cashiers:  “What do you want? Stop speaking
English. We don’t speak that language here. Return to where you come from, John Fru
Ndi”22.
49 Anglophone identity and consciousness are raised by almost daily confrontations with
overbearing Francophone government officials and oppressive Francophone gendarmes
and structures both in the Francophone region and in their own region. Francophone
prefects and sub-prefects posted in Anglophone Cameroon often do not speak a word of
English and tend to behave like chefs de terre or part of commandement (Mbembe 2001:
106-117), relegating, just as in the colonial era, the Anglophone population to the position
of subjects rather than citizens (Mamdani 1996). Moreover, Anglophone “subversives” are
regularly tried in Francophone rather than in Anglophone courts and are subjected to
different  treatment  in  Francophone  cells  than  Francophone  prisoners.  Following  a
conflict over a love affair between a villager and a Francophone gendarme officer in the
North  West  Province  of  Anglophone  Cameroon,  he  and  several  other  villagers  were
arrested  by  gendarmes  and subsequently  charged  with being  SCNC activists.  In  clear
violation  of  Cameroon’s  Penal  Code,  they  were  neither  imprisoned  on  Anglophone
territory where the arrests had taken place nor tried under common law. They were
instead transferred to a prison in Bafoussam, a town in Francophone Cameroon. The
gendarmes told them: “You will be judged in Bafoussam. You say you hate France and
anything  French,  but  you  have  no  choice.”  They  were  instantly  and  provocatively
reminded of their otherness in prison when the Francophone authorities told them that
“Anglophones can never receive the same treatment as Francophones, even in hell” (Jua
2003: 103).
50 Unsurprisingly,  stereotypes  are  commonplace  in  Cameroon  to  mark  the  assumed
differences in values and attitudes between Anglophones and Francophones. In an article
on Francophone “Anglophobia”, Ngome (1993: 28) provided some striking examples of
such stereotyping:
“Anglophones see Francophones as fundamentally fraudulent, superficial and given
to bending rules: cheating of exams, jumping queues, rigging elections and so on…
The  Francophones  are  irked  by  what  they  see  as  the  Anglophone  air  of  self-
righteousness and intellectual superiority.”
51 In his pamphlet The Path to Social Justice, Ngam Chia (1990: 2) stresses the Francophone
“neo-colonial”  mentality  that  compares  most  unfavourably  with  Anglophone
independent-mindedness:
“The Francophone psycho-social background is neo-colonised and as such one must
not expect them to be as independent-minded as the Anglophones. For instance,
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Anglophones see themselves as people who can live without depending on Britain
and France for aid, but the Francophones do not even believe that they can run a
simple administration in the civil  service without the so-called expert direction
from France. To blame them, nevertheless, is to condemn the deep French cultural
alienation of Francophone Cameroon.”
52 Anglophone  leaders  have  made  use  of  such  stereotypes  to  rally  the  Anglophone
population behind them in their pursuit of autonomy, either in the form of a return to
the federal state or outright secession. For example, the 1993 Buea Declaration tended to
blame the “wicked” Francophones as a whole for the plight of the “poor” Anglophones,
and compared both in rather idealised terms: the former, in full solidarity, were seen to
agree among themselves about oppressing the latter who, by their very nature,  were
considered peace-loving, open to dialogue, and committed to freedom (All Anglophone
Conference 1993: 29-30). Of course, such a demagogic approach–which is commonplace in
ethno-regional discourse–seems to highlight the seemingly insurmountable gap between
Anglophones and Francophones that allegedly prevents both parties from living together
peacefully in the union. This approach may be efficient in mobilising Anglophones but
has hardly helped their struggles against their real enemy, the Francophone-dominated
unitary state that has allies and opponents in all parts of the country. In addition, it tends
to project a frozen and geographically restricted idea of being Anglophone, denies the
existence of various ethnic links between Francophones and Anglophones, and creates
serious obstacles to any Francophone sympathy for the Anglophone cause (Konings &
Nyamnjoh 2003).
   
53 In this study, it has been argued that the entry of Anglophone nationalism into the public
space during political  liberalisation has  posed a  major  challenge to the post-colonial
state’s  nation-building  project.  More  than  anything  else,  it  has questioned  whether
Cameroon  has  indeed  progressed  from  a  state  of  national  unity  to  one  of  national
integration (Biya 1987). Little wonder that it has formed the start of a vehement collision
course with the government in power whose head, Paul Biya, has repeatedly remarked
“Le Cameroun sera uni ou ne sera pas” (“Cameroon is one and must remain united”).
54 One has, however, to be extremely careful when claiming that Anglophone nationalism,
which has been crucial to the course of democratisation in Cameroon and has placed
Anglophones  at  the  centre  of  the  political  debate,  is  a  recent  invention  by  some
disgruntled Anglophone elites. Ample evidence has instead been provided here to show
that  Anglophone  nationalism is,  in  fact,  the  result  of  a  long  process  of  Anglophone
identity formation and is currently feeding on the multiple grievances of Anglophones in
the post-reunification era.
55 Although  Anglophone  resistance  has  been  a  permanent  feature  of  Cameroon’s  post-
colonial biography (Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003), it was not until political liberalisation
that  the Anglophone elite  started mobilising and organising the regional  population.
Capitalising  on  traumatic  Anglophone  experiences  of  “otherness”  and  second-class
citizenship in the Francophone-dominated post-colonial state, they began to lay claims to
autonomy and self-determination, in the form first of a return to a federal state and later
in the creation of an independent state. Confronted with persistent government attempts
to  deconstruct  Anglophone  identity  and  to  suppress  Anglophone  organisation,
Anglophone nationalists have increasingly resorted to less obtrusive forms of resistance,
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creating public space for Anglophone identity and nationhood in the historical, artistic,
virtual, legal and everyday domains.
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NOTES
1. See Jeune Afrique Économie, 207, 20 November 1995, p. 3.
2. During the 1961 UN-organised plebiscite, the Northern Cameroons voted for integration
into Nigeria.  For the history of the Northern Cameroons, see, for instance, LE VINE (1964)
and WELCH (1966).
3. Following reunification, the Federal Republic of Cameroon consisted of the federated
state of East Cameroon (former French Cameroon) and the federated state of West
Cameroon (former Southern Cameroons).
4. The Herald, 17 February 2003.
5. The Herald, 22 March 2003.
6. For the various Anglophone movements, see KONINGS & NYAMNJOH (2003).
7. SCNC press release reprinted in the Cameroon Post, 16-23 August 1994, p. 3.
8. The SCNC leaders alleged (i) that the proper procedures for the enactment and
amendment of the federal constitution had not been followed by Ahidjo; and (ii) that
Francophone Cameroon had seceded from the union in 1984 when the Biya government
unilaterally changed the country’s name from the United Republic of Cameroon to the
Republic of Cameroon – the name of independent Francophone Cameroon prior to
reunification.  From this perspective, they often claimed that the Trust Territory of
Southern Cameroons had never really ceased to exist or had been revived.  They
therefore still believed in continued UN responsibility for the Southern Cameroons.  See K
ONINGS & NYAMNJOH (2003).
9. Reference to the incumbent regime as the government of La République du Cameroun,
the name adopted by Francophone Cameroon at independence, has become a key signifier
in the replotting of the country’s constitutional history as a progressive consolidation of
the recolonisation and annexation of Anglophone Cameroon by the post-colonial
Francophone-dominated state.  See EYOH (1998: 264).
10. For example, during his visit to Cameroon in May 2000, the UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan pleaded for dialogue between the Anglophone and Francophone leaders.
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11. MONGA (1996: 89) noted that the Council of Higher Education and the National Council
on Cultural Affairs in Cameroon stipulated that the role of the intellectual was to
contribute in a concrete way to the formation of a national consciousness.
12. This claim was once again made by the Minister of Defence, Ahmadou Ali, in his
address to the National Assembly in April 2000.  See The Herald, 7 April 2000, p. 3.
 Recently, a renowned Cameroonian political scientist and member of cabinet, Elvis
Ngolle Ngolle, argued in The Post (22 January 2001) that “Cameroon came into existence
before the colonial master split us into two. Thank God, in 1961, we came together again
because what God has put together, man was not supposed to put asunder”.  Though the
concepts of nation and state are confounded in this argument, it has good political
purchase among those who argue that Cameroon predated the colonial state.
13. US State Department, Intelligence Report, 8423, 10 March 1961.
14. It is quite revealing that memories of French colonisation are carefully preserved,
manifest in names like Avenue Général de Gaulle in Douala.
15. For a discussion of the role of Anglophone writers and dramatists in the post-
reunification Cameroonian literature, see, for instance, LYONGA et al. (1993).
16. http://www.southerncameroons.org or scncforum@yahoo.groups.com.
17. It was changed to http://www.yahoo.groups.com/group/BSCNation.
18. Cited in http://www.yahoo.groups.com/group/BSCNation/messages/ 975 and 5977.
19. Interview with the moderator on 23 May 2002.
20. Cited in http://yahoo.groups.com/group/BSCNation/message/6830.
21. West Africa, 31 March 2002, p. 19.
22. John Fru Ndi is the charismatic Anglophone founder and chairman of the largest
opposition party in Cameroon, the Social Democratic Front (SDF).  See Le Messager, 30
November 2001, p. 6.
ABSTRACTS
The article examines the historical process leading to the emergence of Anglophone nationalism
in public space during the current liberalisation process in Cameroon. Anglophone nationalism
poses a severe threat to the post-colonial state’s nation-building project that has been driven by
the firm determination of the Francophone political elite to dominate the Anglophone minority
and  to  erase  the  cultural  and  institutional  foundations  of  Anglophone  identity.  Persistent
attempts  by  the  Francophone-dominated  state  to  control  the  newly  created  Anglophone
movements  have  made  Anglophone  nationalists  resort  to  less  obtrusive  forms  of  resistance,
creating public space for an Anglophone identity and nationhood in historical, artistic, virtual,
legal and everyday domains.
Occupation  de  l’espace  public.  Le  nationalisme  anglophone  au  Cameroun. – Cet  article  examine  le
processus  historique  qui  a  abouti  à  l’émergence  d’un nationalisme anglophone dans  l’espace
public au cours du processus actuel de libéralisation au Cameroun. Le nationalisme anglophone
représente une sérieuse menace pour le projet de construction de la nation entrepris par l’État
post-colonial, projet motivé par la ferme résolution de l’élite politique francophone de dominer
la  minorité  anglophone  et  d’effacer  les  fondements  culturels  et  institutionnels  de  l’identité
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anglophone. Les tentatives récurrentes de l’État, dominé par des francophones, visant à contrôler
les  mouvements  anglophones  récemment  créés  ont  incité  les  nationalistes  anglophones  à
recourir à des formes de résistance moins ostentatoires en créant un espace public pour une
identité et un nationalisme anglophones dans les domaines historique, artistique, virtuel, légal et
dans la vie de tous les jours.
INDEX
Mots-clés: construction de la nation, nation-building, Anglophone identity, Anglophone
nationalism, public space, identité anglophone, nationalisme anglophone, espace public.
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